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Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
Introduction
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The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
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X T CT FT
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conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
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b
a
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b
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M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
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soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
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l
Subject who is practically certain
about every event in T .
Model this believe with accept
and reject statement-based un-
certainty models.
Investigate which conditions to im-
pose on T in order to have a co-
herent belief model.
Introduction
Modelling practical certainty and its link with
classical propositional logic Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman
SYSTeMS research group, Ghent University, Belgium {Arthur.VanCamp,Gert.deCooman}@UGent.be
Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
l
Subject who is practically certain
about every event in T .
Model this believe with accept
and reject statement-based un-
certainty models.
Investigate which conditions to im-
pose on T in order to have a co-
herent belief model.
Accept & reject statements
Accept & reject statements
Modelling practical certainty and its link with
classical propositional logic Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman
SYSTeMS research group, Ghent University, Belgium {Arthur.VanCamp,Gert.deCooman}@UGent.be
Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
l
The subject’s assessment A con-
sist of two sets: his set of accep-
ted gambles A and his set of
rejected gambles A≺.
X = {a,b}b
a
There are four rationality criteria.
Accept & reject statements
Modelling practical certainty and its link with
classical propositional logic Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman
SYSTeMS research group, Ghent University, Belgium {Arthur.VanCamp,Gert.deCooman}@UGent.be
Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
l
The subject’s assessment A con-
sist of two sets: his set of accep-
ted gambles A and his set of
rejected gambles A≺.
X = {a,b}b
a
There are four rationality criteria.
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Modelling practical certainty and its link with
classical propositional logic Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman
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Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
There are four rationality criteria.
I Indifference to status quo
I Deductive closure
I No Confusion
I No Limbo
modelM
a
b
We can derive other sets of gambles.
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Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
There are four rationality criteria.
I Indifference to status quo
I Deductive closure
I No Confusion
I No Limbo
modelM
a
b
We can derive other sets of gambles.
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Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
There are four rationality criteria.
I Indifference to status quo
I Deductive closure
I No Confusion
I No Limbo
modelM
a
b
We can derive other sets of gambles.
Accept & reject statements
Modelling practical certainty and its link with
classical propositional logic Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman
SYSTeMS research group, Ghent University, Belgium {Arthur.VanCamp,Gert.deCooman}@UGent.be
Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
There are four rationality criteria.
I Indifference to status quo
I Deductive closure
I No Confusion
I No Limbo
modelM
a
b
We can derive other sets of gambles.
Accept & reject statements
Modelling practical certainty and its link with
classical propositional logic Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman
SYSTeMS research group, Ghent University, Belgium {Arthur.VanCamp,Gert.deCooman}@UGent.be
Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
We can derive other sets of gambles.
I A gamble f is favourable if
f ∈MB :=M∩−M≺.
I A gamble f is indifferent if
f ∈M' :=M∩−M.
Accept & reject statements
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Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
We can derive other sets of gambles.
I A gamble f is favourable if
f ∈MB :=M∩−M≺.
I A gamble f is indifferent if
f ∈M' :=M∩−M.
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Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
We can derive other sets of gambles.
I A gamble f is favourable if
f ∈MB :=M∩−M≺.
I A gamble f is indifferent if
f ∈M' :=M∩−M.
First type: favourability
assessment
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Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
l
If a subject is practically certain
that an event A will occur, we will
take this to mean that
A AB := {−IAc + ε : ε ∈ R>0}
is favourable.
If a subject is practically certain
that every event in T will occur,
we will take this to mean that
AB := {−IAc + ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈ R>0}
is favourable. His assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉.
First type: favourability assessment
Modelling practical certainty and its link with
classical propositional logic Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman
SYSTeMS research group, Ghent University, Belgium {Arthur.VanCamp,Gert.deCooman}@UGent.be
Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
l
If a subject is practically certain
that an event A will occur, we will
take this to mean that
A AB := {−IAc + ε : ε ∈ R>0}
is favourable.
If a subject is practically certain
that every event in T will occur,
we will take this to mean that
AB := {−IAc + ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈ R>0}
is favourable. His assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉.
First type: favourability assessment
Modelling practical certainty and its link with
classical propositional logic Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman
SYSTeMS research group, Ghent University, Belgium {Arthur.VanCamp,Gert.deCooman}@UGent.be
Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
l
If a subject is practically certain
that an event A will occur, we will
take this to mean that
A AB := {−IAc + ε : ε ∈ R>0}
is favourable.
If a subject is practically certain
that every event in T will occur,
we will take this to mean that
AB := {−IAc + ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈ R>0}
is favourable. His assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉.
Second type: indifference
assessment
Second type: indifference assessment
Modelling practical certainty and its link with
classical propositional logic Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman
SYSTeMS research group, Ghent University, Belgium {Arthur.VanCamp,Gert.deCooman}@UGent.be
Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
l
If a subject is practically certain
that an event A will occur, we will
now take this to mean that he is
indifferent between IA and 1, or
equivalently, between IAc and 0.
⇒A ′A' := {IAc} is indifferent.
⇒A ′A = {±IAc} is acceptable.
If a subject is practically certain
that every event in T will occur,
we will now take this to mean that
A ′ := {±IAc : A ∈T }
is acceptable. His assessment is
A ′ =
〈
A ′; /0
〉
.
Second type: indifference assessment
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Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
l
If a subject is practically certain
that an event A will occur, we will
now take this to mean that he is
indifferent between IA and 1, or
equivalently, between IAc and 0.
⇒A ′A' := {IAc} is indifferent.
⇒A ′A = {±IAc} is acceptable.
If a subject is practically certain
that every event in T will occur,
we will now take this to mean that
A ′ := {±IAc : A ∈T }
is acceptable. His assessment is
A ′ =
〈
A ′; /0
〉
.
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Modelling practical certainty and its link with
classical propositional logic Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman
SYSTeMS research group, Ghent University, Belgium {Arthur.VanCamp,Gert.deCooman}@UGent.be
Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
l
If a subject is practically certain
that an event A will occur, we will
now take this to mean that he is
indifferent between IA and 1, or
equivalently, between IAc and 0.
⇒A ′A' := {IAc} is indifferent.
⇒A ′A = {±IAc} is acceptable.
If a subject is practically certain
that every event in T will occur,
we will now take this to mean that
A ′ := {±IAc : A ∈T }
is acceptable. His assessment is
A ′ =
〈
A ′; /0
〉
.
Second type: indifference assessment
Assessment A ′
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
t
Second type: indifference assessment
Smallest assessment that includes the background model
B′ =A ′∪〈L≥0;LC0〉
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
t
First rationality requirement Indifference to status quo: 0 ∈L≥0.
Second type: indifference assessment
Deductive closure
D ′ =
〈
posiB′;B≺
〉
with posiB′ = {f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IBf ≥ 0}
Here, CT :=
{⋂n
k=1Ak : n ∈ N,Ak ∈T
}
is the filter base generated by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
t
Second rationality requirement: D ′ should be Deductive Closed.
Second type: indifference assessment
Deductive closure
D ′ =
〈
posiB′;B≺
〉
with posiB′ = {f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IBf ≥ 0}
Here, CT :=
{⋂n
k=1Ak : n ∈ N,Ak ∈T
}
is the filter base generated by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
t
Second rationality requirement: D ′ should be Deductive Closed.
Second type: indifference assessment
Deductive closure
D ′ =
〈
posiB′;B≺
〉
with posiB′ = {f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IBf ≥ 0}
Here, FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )C ⊆ B}
is the filter generated by T .
FT = {{b},{a,b}}
b
a
FT = { /0,{a},{b},{a,b}}
b
a
t
Second rationality requirement: D ′ should be Deductive Closed.
Second type: indifference assessment
No Confusion: D ′∩D ′≺ = /0
FT = {{b},{a,b}}
b
a
FT = { /0,{a},{b},{a,b}}
b
a
t
Third rationality requirement: No Confusion⇔ /0 /∈ CT .
Second type: indifference assessment
No Limbo:
(
D≺−D
)\D≺ should be rejected
FT = {{b},{a,b}}
b
a
t
Fourth rationality requirement: No Limbo.
Embedding classical
propositional logic
Embedding classical propositional logic
Modelling practical certainty and its link with
classical propositional logic Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman
SYSTeMS research group, Ghent University, Belgium {Arthur.VanCamp,Gert.deCooman}@UGent.be
Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
l
We show that the language of our
models for practical certainty essen-
tially equals the language of filters.
Conclusion
Modelling practical certainty and its link with
classical propositional logic Arthur Van Camp and Gert de Cooman
SYSTeMS research group, Ghent University, Belgium {Arthur.VanCamp,Gert.deCooman}@UGent.be
Context A subject who is practically certain about the occurrence of
every event in a collection T .
Accept & reject statements We try to model this certainty in the lan-
guage of accept and reject statement-based uncertainty models.
Motivation This language is rich enough to encompass the different
approaches of Walley and de Finetti. In order to obtain more insight in
these approaches, we study different types of assessments.
(Sets of) events The random variable X about which the subject ex-
presses practical certainty takes values inX . All events are collected in
the power set P := {A : A⊆X }. /0 6= C ⊆P is a filter base if it is closed
under finite intersections (closed under conjunction): if A,B ∈ C , then also
A∩B ∈ C . C is called proper if in addition /0 /∈ C . /0 6=F ⊆P is called a
filter if: (i) F is closed under conjunction, and (ii) F is increasing (closed
under modus ponens): if A ∈F and B⊇ A, then also B ∈F . F is called
proper if in addition /0 /∈F . We denote the set of all proper filters by F
(Sets of) gambles A gamble f is a bounded real-valued function on X .
The set of all gambles is L . If f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈X , we write f ≥ 0, and
the set of all such gambles is L≥0. We write f > 0 if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0. The
set of all such gambles is L>0. If f (x) > 0 for all x ∈X , we write f B 0,
and the set of all such gambles is LB0.
Introduction
Accepting & rejecting The subject gives his assess-
ment A by making accept and reject statements about
gambles f ∈L .
Accepting f implies a commitment for the subject to en-
gage in the following transaction:
(i) the actual value x of X is determined
(ii) he gets the—possible negative—payoff f (x).
Rejecting f means that the subject excludes f from being
accepted.
Assessment A is a pair of accepted (A) and rejected
(A≺) gambles: A = 〈A;A≺〉.
X = {a,b} b
a
b
a
b
a
There are four rationality requirements.
Background model Before an assess-
ment is given, some gambles can be pre-
sumed to be accepted and others to be
rejected. Such a priori assumptions can
be captured by positing a background
model S .
〈L≥0;L<0〉 b
a
First rationality requirement :
Indifference to status quo: 〈{0}; /0〉 ⊆S
B :=A ∪S b
a
b
a
b
a
Deductive closure If f and g are acceptable, then so
should be f + g and λ f , with λ ∈R>0. These two observa-
tions are summarised in the deductive extension
D = extDB := 〈posiB;B≺〉 ,
where posiB := {∑nk=1λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈B}, the
positive linear hull of B.
Second rationality requirement :
A should be deductive closed: extDA =A
D b
a
b
a
b
a
No Confusion Given the interpretation attached to an ac-
cept and to a reject statement, we have as a
Third rationality requirement :
D should have No Confusion: DG := D∩D≺ = /0.
DG
b
a
b
a
b
a
No Limbo One can still accept or reject each unresolved
gamble inD^ := (D∪D≺)c. Gambles in Limbo
(
D≺−D
)\
D≺ ⊆ D^ can only be rejected, if No Confusion is to be
avoided. Here, D≺ := {λk fk : n ∈N,λk ∈R>0, fk ∈D≺} is the
positive scalar hull of D≺. This observation is summarised
in the reckoning extension
M = extMD :=
〈
D;D≺∪ (D≺−D)
〉
.
Fourth rationality requirement :
D should have No Limbo: extMD = D
M b
a
b
a
b
a
Accept & reject statements
Favourability A gamble f is favourable if f ∈ AB := A ∩−A≺: f is
accepted and − f is rejected.
Assessment about one event A If a subject is practically certain that
an event A occurs, we will first take this to mean that he finds any gam-
ble in A AB := {−IAc+ ε : ε ∈R>0} favourable: he accepts to bet on A at
odds ε/1−ε and refuses to bet against A at odds 1−ε/ε.
Assessment about more events T If he is practically certain that each
event in T ⊆P occurs, then his assessment is
A = 〈AB;−AB〉 with AB = {−IAc+ ε : A ∈T ,ε ∈R>0}.
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Background model We assume the background model S =
〈L≥0;L<0〉, which yields the smallest assessment B = A ∪S that in-
cludes both A and S .
T = {{b}}
b
a
T = {{a,b}}
b
a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment D = extDB =
〈posiB;B≺〉 is determined by
posiB = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT ) inf( f |B) > 0}∪L≥0 =:L mT ∪L≥0,
where CT := {⋂nk=1Ak : n ∈N,Ak ∈T } ⊆ P, the filter base generated
by T .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion is equivalent with the finite intersection property:⋂n
k=1Ak 6= /0 for all n ∈N and Ak ∈T , or equivalently, /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo The reckoning extensionM = extMD is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M = 〈L mT ∪L≥0;L lT ∪L<0〉,
so MB = L mT ∪L>0 = M \ {0}.
The last two examples have Con-
fusion, what means that the ex-
pressed practical certainty is not ra-
tional. Therefore, these examples
are not continued.
All practical certain events Does the inference procedure described
above, which allows us to infer from the set of favourable gambles AB the
larger set of favourable gambles MB, bear any relationship to inference in
classical propositional logic? For which events A ∈P is A AB ⊆MB?
A AB ⊆MB⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
where FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )(C ⊆ B)} is the filter generated by T .
X T CT FT
{a,b,c} {{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c}} {{a},{a,b},{a,c},{a,b,c}}
conjunction modus ponens
This tells us that on our specific interpretation of it, the logic of practical
certainty has the same basic machinery as classical propositional logic.
First type: favourability assessment
Indifference A gamble f is indifferent if f ∈ A' := A∩
−A: both f and its negation − f are accepted.
Assessment about one event If a subject is practically
certain that an event A occurs, we will now take this to
mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently,
between −IAc and 0.
Assessment about more
events T If he is prac-
tically certain that each
event T ⊆P occurs, then
his assessment is
A ′ = 〈{−IAc : A ∈T } ; /0〉.
T = {{b}}
b a
T = {{a,b}}
b a
T = {{a},{b}}
b
a
T = { /0}
b
a
S ′ b
a
Background model Because −IA ∈
L<0, the nature of this assessment
forces us to assume a slightly different
background model: S ′ = 〈L≥0;LC0〉.
This yields the smallest assessment
B′ =S ′∪A ′ that includes S ′ and A ′.
Deductive closure The deductively closed assessment
D ′ = extDB′ =
〈
posiB′;B
′
≺
〉
is determined by
posiB′ = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f ≥ 0}=:L ≥T ,
so the indifferent gambles are
D ′' = { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IB f = 0} .
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
CT = { /0,{a},{b}}
b
a
CT = { /0}
b
a
No Confusion if and only if /0 /∈ CT .
No Limbo LetL CT := { f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )(∀x ∈ B) f (x) < 0}.
The reckoning extensionM ′ = extDD ′ is given by
CT = {{b}}
b
a
CT = {{a,b}}
b
a
M ′ =
〈
L ≥T ;L
C
T
〉
,
soM ′B =L BT andM
′
' =D
′
'.
The last two examples have
Confusion. Therefore, these
examples are not continued.
All practical certain events To find all such events, we
look at the events A ∈P for which we have that −IAc ∈M ′'.
We find
−IAc ∈M ′'⇔ (∃B ∈ CT )B⊆ A⇔ A ∈FT ,
which leads to the same conclusions as for the first type of
assessments.
Second type: indifference assessment
Indifference assessments
Denote the collection of all assessments by A. Consider
the family of models for practical certainty following from
indifference assessments:
C′ :=
{〈
L ≥F ;L
C
F
〉
: F ∈ F}⊆ A.
Then we have
(A,C′,⊆) is a strong belief structure,
meaning that (i) (A,⊆) is a complete lattice where ⋂ plays
the role of infimum, (ii) (C′,⊆) is an intersection struc-
ture: for any /0 6= B ∈ C′, infB ∈ C′, (iii) (C′,⊆) has no
top, and (iv) (C′,⊆) is dually atomic: Cˆ 6= /0 and D =
inf
{
D ′ ∈ Cˆ′ : D ⊆D ′} if D ∈ C′. We have also
(C′,⊆) and (F,⊆) are order isomorphic,
which means that F and C′ are essentially the same.
Favourability assessments
Consider the family of models for practical certainty follow-
ing from favourability assessments:
C := {〈L mF ∪L≥0;L lF ∪L<0〉 : F ∈ F} ⊆ A.
Unfortunately, (A,C,⊆) is no strong belief structure:
(A,C,⊆) is no intersection structure.
Luckily, we can still find an embedding of F into C.
Consider a coherent set of favourable gambles DB de-
rived from an assessment that includes S and take
any A ⊆ P such that L mA ∪ L≥0 ⊆ DB. Let F :=
{B ∈P : (∀ε ∈R>0)−IBc+ ε ∈DB}. Then
(i) F ∈ F; (ii) L mF ∪L≥0 ⊆DB; (iii) A ⊆F .
Embedding classical propositional logic
Be welcome at our poster!
